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FROM CLEAR COMPREHENSION TO RESPONSIBLE ACTION: A TEXTUALLY GROUNDED FRAMEWORK FOR ETHICAL MINDFULNESS EDUCATION BASED ON THE SATIPAṬṬHĀNA AND SEDAKA SUTTAS

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ABSTRACT

Mindfulness education aims to improve attention and affect regulation yet these abilities alone do not account for how learners are to respond to the needs of others. This theoretical article develops an account of how awareness of experience relates to ethically appropriate action. The main corpus of texts – the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (MN 10), Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta (DN 22), and Sedaka Sutta (SN 47.19) – is interpreted in the light of Theravāda explanations of sampajaññan and certain Mahāyāna writings. The methodological approach involves a close reading of texts, conceptual differentiation, and normative reconstruction. The resulting presentation involves four educational components: recognizing one's state, assessing one's aim, considering one's impact, and acting appropriately. These components are the article's approach to analysis, not a fourfold pedagogy found in the texts with which the Buddha is sometimes identified. Intratextual oppositionality in SN 47.19 is linked to an intertextual reciprocal protection as a formulation of social constraint on educational adaptation, and other discourses on intention, speech, and consequence build understanding of reflection and speech. Three hypothetical situations explore the response to conflict, communication, and collective responsibility, and a tentative rubric intervenes between intentions and calmness as success. Its real-world practicality has yet to be demonstrated; future research could look at

the feasibility of implementing the intervention in schools, how it is interpreted in the new context, transfer of effects and possible nuisance variables.

KEYWORDS: Ethical Mindfulness; Sampajañña; Satipaṭṭhāna; Sedaka Sutta; Buddhist Education.

INTRODUCTION

A studious human can notice irritation without knowing whether to apologize, appeal against an inappropriate demand, or shield a classmate from shame. And a teacher can remain tranquil while implementing a corrosive custom. These examples bring to light an educational justification problem: noticing experience doesn't entail or determine, which purposes warrant pursuit and, which interests warrant protection. Mindfulness education needs an account of how and when noticing experience yields answerable conduct. The defining distinction between educationally "thin" and "thick" mindfulness illuminates this question by raising this dilemma: what are the reference-frames of the person, aims of education, and ideals of ethical conduct (McCaw, 2020).

There is no point in simply stating that Buddhist mindfulness is good. As Canon scholarship has demonstrated, various attempts to define mindfulness as beyond remembrance, observation, and the path of practice, have been critiqued (Bodhi, 2011; Dreyfus, 2011). Shulman (2024) considers the mutual dependence between morality, mindfulness, and the development of consciousness. In a more practical vein, Berger et al. (2024) explore how pedagogical interventions can develop awareness of oneself with awareness of the other. These studies determine that the field of inquiry of the broad question as put to the paper is not yet a new area, but an established research issue.

Nor is the interpersonal meaning of the Sedaka Sutta uncovered. Anālayo (2012) has analyzed the acrobat simile of this discourse considering the Saṃyukta-āgama parallel and the protection of self and others. Any attempt to trace the socio-political significance of this discourse would be to exaggerate its relevance. This article offers a contained educational reading: outlining four discernible pragmatic tasks, their textual support, limits of interpretation, and formulating them as cases and reckonable reasoning.

The research question is: 'in which way can MN 10, DN 22 and SN 47.19 read with explanations of sampajañña be used to formulate an educational model of insight into self-conditioning to self-responsibility?' The answer is: awareness of one's condition – reflection – consideration of the effect – responsible action. The last component also comprises revisiting

an earlier decision when the effect becomes clearer. This is a new modern proposal for analysis. It is not the same as the four establishments of mindfulness and it is not only a new phrase for the commentarial fourfold explanation of clear comprehension (Anālayo, 2003; Soma, 1998).

This is the mainly envisaged environment--Buddhist tertiary institutions and within them, settings where monastic and lay students learn and practise in company. It might also be used in other settings if the institution's Buddhist origins and normative considerations are made explicit. The paper is conceptual and illustrative, not an empirical classroom- based intervention or assessment of outcomes; these matter more for educational effectiveness than philosophical rigour (Van Dam et al., 2018).

SCHOLARSHIP AND THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE PRESENT STUDY

2.1 Mindfulness as an ethically situated capacity

One cannot determine the precise sense of sati by picking one current English translation and using it as a rubric for all Buddhist texts. Kuan (2008) investigates the role of sati in Pāli, Chinese, and Sanskrit texts; Gethin (2011) discusses the distinctions between influential definitions of it. These and related research demonstrate the need for terminological caution: terms like "attention, " "awareness, " "mindfulness, " and "clear comprehension" show some overlap of use but are not simply analogous technical terms. Within an account of educational mindfulness**,** we must be clear about the activities a term has been chosen to refer to, and why.

A relevant modern operational proposal makes regulation of attention separate from orientation of curiosity, openness, and acceptance to experience (Bishop et al., 2004). Such explication will assist in the specification of psychological processes. It will not specify justification in regard to an intended act; the learner could recognize envy openly and yet determine to withhold information from the competitor. The current proposal raises a clear practical inquiry: what response can be justified in the presence of another person's vulnerability?

That this addition should not make modern programmers caricatured as ethically indifferent. While Kabat - Zinn (2003) introduces mindfulness-based interventions in a wider account of practice, education, and the alleviation of suffering, Monteiro et al (2015) discuss the dialectic between traditional and modern programs and the pedagogic role of ethics. The defensible critique then is of an inference, not of the entire enterprise: improved attention or self-reported well-being cannot be automatically interpreted as increased responsibility.

Recent definitional work also continues to document the debate on the role of ethics and memory in traditional and modern mindfulness (Chems-Maarif et al., 2025). As a result, any structure should clearly articulate its normative commitments. In this case, they are non-harming, honest conveying of information, careful listening to others, and the changeability of behavior. The pedagogical articulation is a matter for discussion, but they are not hidden in a purportedly impartial attentional strategy.

2.2 Education and the assessment of moral development

Considering the purpose of learning through a different lens Hyland (2011) grounds mindfulness in education as more than an intervention but its own moral and affective purpose. Showing that the ends of mindfulness cannot be divorced from the practices, McCaw (2020) highlights the vital role understanding these practices are supposed to achieve plays in their efficacy. These complement one another, demanding that instead of asking what the effects of a specific classroom activity are, we ask what students are abler to notice, question, and do.

Evidence gives some grounds for weaker claims. There is a positive correlation between mindfulness and prosociality in a recent meta-analysis, but far more study is needed into how conclusions about meditation and prosociality are affected by outcome type and methodological quality (2018). These results do not show that explicit training in ethical reflection is superfluous, or that the current system will prove successful.

School-based evidence same thing needs separating. Dunning et al. (2019) interrogate randomized trials with children and adolescents, and the many trial reported that its universal school-based mindfulness course was not more effective than usual classroom practice on its primary outcomes after one year (Kuyken et al., 2022) (2019). Neither delivers our understanding of Buddhist higher education or the proposed structure. Both are the closest we have for approach: that gains are proven for a defined group programmer comparator and desired effect.

2.3 A specific rather than absolute novelty claim

So where the contribution is a chain of traceable hermeneutic steps. The article presents traditional standard accounts of awareness, a commentarial lexicon with which to explore activity, and a relation principle of protection. It then offers four educational elements, and what forms evidence for the doability of practical reasoning, more narrowly, than could be posited as the first Buddhist philosophy of mindfulness (Anālayo, 2012; Berger et al., 2024).

The design can also be rectified. If a component has no strong textual warrant, it should be adjusted. If the learners are more fluent in approved language but no more responsive to

others, the pedagogy should be revised. A textually based design must allow for both forms of criticism; its only contribution is the explicit connection between interpretive warrant and pedagogical judgement, not the presence of four headings.

METHOD AND INTERPRETIVE BOUNDARIES

3.1 Corpus and source hierarchy

In the canon, MN 10, DN 22, and SN 47.19 comprise the primary trilogy. The first two offers the primary meditative contexts, while the third explicitly mentions the notion of protecting the self as well as the other. Source texts are the English translations of Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi (1995), Bodhi (2000), and Ṭhānissaro (2000 2008b 2013). While helping direct comparison between the translations by supplying discourse identifiers, these texts may be used to compare translations by comparing identical passages, identified by being short, with intermediate passages, identified by paraphrased passages.

Three other discourses serve more specific functions. MN 61 lays out a time line of reflection before, during, and after activity; MN 58 defines the role of judgement in speech; MN 117 relates mindfulness to other path factors. AN 6.63 distinguishes intention from a simple stated goal (Ṭhānissaro, 1997a, 1997b, 2006, 2008a). These are references, which situate the core corpus, not supplant it.

The main commentarial material is Soma's (1998) translation of the Satipaṭṭhāna discourse and related commentary and sub commentarial excerpts. The fourfold explication of sampajaññan is considered as a traditional Theravāda interpretive elaboration. It is not quoted in full from MN 10 or DN 22. Heim's (2014) exploration of Buddhaghosa highlights the importance of differentiating disciplines when analyzing intention and agency.

Northern sources of material are for two different ends. The Chinese Saṃyukta-āgama parallel is referenced in Anālayo (2012), translated, and studied; it is a comparative witness to an early discourse, not evidence that an Āgama is a Mahāyāna. Śāntideva, and the Lotus Sūtra establish later Mahāyāna comparisons. These comparisons are for known constructive ends; they are not used to retroactively establish the etymology of the terms in Pāli (Śāntideva, 1995; Kubo & Yuyama, 2007).

3.2 Analytical procedure

The analysis unfolds in three steps. Initially, a textual reading pinpoints the recommended activity, the qualities related to it, and its declared orientation. Next, conceptual analysis differentiates awareness of a condition, assessment of a purpose, reflection on consequences, and dedication to a response. Finally, normative reconstruction considers, which educational

practices might embody these distinctions while staying true to the original sources. These steps distinguish description from an application that the sources themselves do not mandate.

Three types of warrant are employed throughout the text. Direct warrant denotes a clearly identifiable textual instruction or distinction. Interpretive warrant indicates a connection supported by commentary or scholarly work. Constructive extension involves a contemporary educational proposal, such as consulting a student affected by the issue or documenting reasons behind a decision. This last type may be justifiable even if it is not historically ancient. Comparative scholarship on satipaṭṭhāna emphasizes attention to textual differences rather than the creation of a single, undifferentiated tradition (Anālayo, 2013).

A purposive (not systematic) literature review sources are relevant to the core discourses are readily understandable, and insights have applicability to Buddhist ethics, mindfulness education, and the limits of outcome claims. The article does not report exhaustive database searches or bibliometric coverage of the literature, nor prove that the same structure has never been published. Its claim is a reasoned synthesis in context of previous work.

3.3 Normative scope

"Responsible action" in this section is defined as one for which the agent can give reasons about purpose, foreseeable harm, other's interests, and subsequent correction; this is a provisional educational definition. It is not intended as a translation of one Pāli term or as a comprehensive treatment of Buddhist moral thought. Harvey (2000) lists the variety of categories of ethical concern in Buddhist traditions, and Garfield (2022) stresses the importance of the experience of persons as persons.

The structure does not need to think that these limited educational goals are disconnected from the 'liberative' context of the discourses. Mindfulness is situating as part of a path to the end of suffering (not simply of the classroom adjustment) (Ṭhānissaro 2000 DN 22) (Ṭhānissaro, 2000, DN 22). A contemporary programme may choose practices suited to education but it needs to clarify that they are choosing these rather than constructing a programme that they present as 'Buddhist'.

Mindfulness then comes out as within a comprehensible pattern of cultivation rather than random expediency in whatever circumstances happen to emerge (Ṭhānissaro, 2008b, MN 10; Bodhi, 2011). For education, the relevant inference is limited. A learner can be taught to differentiate between "I notice resentment" and "My resentment proves that the other person is wrong." The first statement simply identifies a condition; the second involves making an interpersonal judgment that takes additional justification

This recognition offers a chance to examine that transition, but it does not automatically resolve it. Dreyfus's (2011) exploration of the cognitive aspects of mindfulness helps clarify why reflective discrimination can be included in practice.

Vedanā must also be treated with caution. The agreeable, disagreeable, and neither-pleasant-nor-unpleasant nature of experience does not map on to our modern totality of emotion. Some classroom exercises will be able to separate tension in the body, unpleasant tone of feeling, a perception of insult, and a wish to strike back without suggesting that this is the BOD's perfect rearticulation (Anālayo, 2003; Kuan, 2008).

The physical body part can readily include awareness of movement as we go about normal activity, talking, and silence being noted. This makes normal activity useful for interpretation but does not be a teaching of communication now (Ṭhānissaro 2008b MN 10) (Ṭhānissaro, 2008b, MN 10). Extension for the learner and for society would be where is silence protective of understanding, and when does silence reveal another? Perceived outwardly the same.

DN 22 clarifies the normative environment more widely by giving a fuller account of the four noble truths and the eightfold path, right intention, right speech, right action (Ṭhānissaro 2000 DN 22) (Ṭhānissaro, 2000, DN 22). An educative reconstruction should so avoid limiting an attention practice to proof of the morality of behavior. The point is to link the attention practice with the reasons to speak abstain act, or help.

4.2 Clear comprehension and the examination of activity

The commentarial analysis differentiates clear discernment on intent (sātthaka), applicability (sappāya), context (gocara), and non-delusion (asammoha). To do is to consider the existence and suitability of a course of action; domain to further defines the scope of meditation practices; and nondelusion to define the understanding of an action without a delusional assignedlasting officer.These definitions should be displayed when cross-referencing words (Soma, 1998, "The Section on the Four Kinds of Clear Comprehension").

The pedagogical benefit of intention arises from Truth is an agent's first account might be partial. A student might claim that a peer's correction operates accuracy but simultaneously studentship. Identifying embodied incentives doesn't necessarily negate correction but might have implications for the correction's style. The suggested inquiry: what goal is instantiated and what kind of bias might sometimes preempt goal-directedness? Is a pedagogical re-eudcation inspired by the commentarial distinction and intentionality literature (Heim, 2014).

Suitability raises another problem. An intelligible goal may be realized by an inappropriate means. Calling attention to a mistake may be in public, if the mistake affects many; in another context, a private channel may do. The approach uses suitability to focus on means time audience, and skill. These classroom factors are applied here; they are not a "rough translation" of what the commentary list says (Soma, 1998).

Domain and non-delusion are not just reduced to "consider effects" and "choosing action." They are what they are on their own terms. In the current argument, I am only tentatively adopting a limited analogy from them: the reflective notion should stay linked to action and the agent should be cautious about how he considers a habitual point of view to be an undisputed possession. This is not to equate a social perspective-taking exercise with insight into no self. Anālayo (2003) broader discussion of satipaṭṭhāna can help preserve this distinction.

To that extent the relation of commentarial and educational schemes is because of this many to many. To consider purpose relies heavily on sātthaka, to consider means relies on sappāya, and continuous mindfulness applies in both schemes. The educational schemes perform a separate function and need no further from either their own text apart from being numbered four.

4.3 Reciprocal protection in the Sedaka Sutta

SN 47.19 defines an acrobat and apprentice whose good performance hinges on their behavior. Its instruction unites protection of oneself and protection of others. As translated in Ṭhānissaro (2013): "When watching after yourself, you watch after others." The reverbal direction is then elaborated with endurance harmlessness good-will, and sympathy. Mindfulness is this way given a relational linage, and terms that will be relevant to the good of others (Bodhi 2000 SN 47.19) (Bodhi, 2000, SN 47.19).

The two directions should not be conflated into the idea that every private improvement is an improvement for everyone else. The first is simply fostering of practice; the second describes ways of relating. Anālayo's (2012) comparative study has highlighted the link between self-cultivation and care for others; responding to this legacy, the article here advances an educational rule: learners cannot offer a rationale that a responded-to action is in the service of others' welfare; rather, they can only say how the calmer state is an explanation.

Suppose the teacher pauses before she responds to disruption. The pause may diminish the likelyhood of an impulsive insult. But its protective value still hinges on what comes after: a fair hearing, a true report of the event, and an appropriate response. If the teacher responds with greater equanimity to a humiliating regime, then self-regulation has not met the resourcefulness condition. This is a novel use of the reciprocal-protection principle, not an argument for an educational example that appears in SN 47.19.

The acrobat image also aids in distinguishing between responsibility and control. One individual cannot substitute for another's involvement in a shared activity. In a classroom setting, taking responsibility does not necessarily mean managing another learner's thoughts or demanding a specific emotional response. Instead, it can involve fulfilling one's own duties while creating conditions that allow others to participate safely. This comparison offers educational insight without turning the analogy into a full theory of institutional governance.

Reciprocity also needs to be read normatively as not an immediate return. An individual who intervenes to stop bullying may be victimised himself, or a teacher who admits to making a mistake may become humiliated. Protective intervention does not necessarily have a good immediate outcome for the intervening individual. The system this way considers the motivations of and the nature of the action plus its foreseeable and actual consequences, rather than personal comfort (Harvey, 2000).

4.4 Intention and the temporal review of action

All SA 6.63 links kamma to intention and so motivation is relevant to an ethical evaluation (Ṭhānissaro 1997b AN 6.63) (Ṭhānissaro, 1997b, AN 6.63). This does not mean we simply accept the person's label. "I meant to help" reveals an honest intention without necessarily ending deliberation about the action's appropriateness and result. Separate analysis of motivation and justification allows us to appreciate good intention without accepting it as the end of discussion.

MN 61 also gives a more familiar addition: reflection relates to potential, current, and finished physical, speech, and mental activities, with worry about harm inflicted on oneself, others, or both (Ṭhānissaro 2006 MN 61) (Ṭhānissaro, 2006, MN 61). The lesson here for our schooling: responsibilities aren't limited to the act of choosing. If feedback indicates harm that was ignored, then the issue will be what must change, not whether the initial desire was defensible.

MN 58, for instance, makes a distinction between truth advantages pleasantness, and timeliness of speech (Ṭhānissaro 1997a MN 58) (Ṭhānissaro, 1997a, MN 58). This instruction is useful in the classroom because it might block the identification of wise speech with pleasantry. An identifying lies, a boundary setting, or a report of abuse may be unpleasant but defensible. It is the teacher's work to help students defend their response without bludgeoning candor or upholding social silence.

A FOUR-COMPONENT FRAMEWORK FOR ETHICAL MINDFULNESS EDUCATION

5.1 Recognising one's condition

The first object is what is occurring in the student's present moment. Its objects could be tension in the body, feeling tone doubt an interpretive story, or the urge to speak or act. The intended pedagogic move is discernment: what we directly experience is distinguished from what we infer about somebody else. Its main basis for support is the resolution of variance in satipaṭṭhāna and the interpretive support literature (Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi, 1995, MN 10; Kuan, 2008).

Labeling should not turn into a requirement of having the "appropriate" feeling. A student may clearly recognize anger and yet be unsure about what action to take. This is still a step in the right direction compared to reacting immediately or refusing to respond. So, the evaluation can focus on how well a child articulated an experience versus a personal correlation, not claiming that a person was or was not feeling warm and fuzzy inside. The model does not allow teachers to guess what someone else is feeling.

5.2 Examining purpose

The second factor considers what the learner aims to accomplish, and whether the aim is worth striving for. There are two types of aim that make a difference: a stated aim (e.g. "correcting an incorrect statement of fact"), and the intent in circumstances that may influence the aim's implementation (e.g. competition fear). Associated texts include the commentary's preoccupation with the aim, and the more general relation between right view, effort, and mindfulness in MN 117 (Soma, 1998; Ṭhānissaro, 2008a). It also reveals tensions between an institution's professed interest in welfare and the reality of maintaining its reputation.

5.3 Considering effects on oneself and others

The third element concerned issues of who might be harmed, how, and where there is lack of clarity. SN 47.19 offers a conceptual orientation, while MN 61 offers a more explicit consideration of harm for the course of action (Bodhi 2000 SN 47.19; Ṭhānissaro 2006 MN 61) (Bodhi, 2000, SN 47.19; Ṭhānissaro, 2006, MN 61). The modern extension includes issues of power, reliance, and differential risk. This is then introduced as a matter of educational judgement, rather than ascribed directly to the ancient works.

Thinking about consequences demands an epistemic science. A novice must identify the observed response, the respondent's report, and a guess. 'They didn't object' is a flimsy argument for acceptance if a teacher shapes the probe. 'They will thank you' is not for replacing investigation. Consultation, if warranted, offers others' competence control their representation by the assumedly compassionate decision-maker.

This element does not involve summing benefits and harms in a numerical fashion. But a false intervention does not qualify as innocuous just because the agent predicting it believes it will be convenient for a plurality. The scheme involves a consideration of effects coupled with means restrictions that involve truthfulness and non-harm. That's why, it is an actual educational scheme, not a proposal to resolve the entire issue of whether Buddhist ethics is perhaps a consequentialist, virtue-based, et cetera (Harvey 2000; Garfield 2022) (Harvey, 2000; Garfield, 2022).

5.4 Choosing and revising responsible action

In the fourth case, there should be an answer: to speak, to hold back, to ask, to help, to oppose, to refer, to vary. The learner should say as to why the quality of purpose is served by the way it is expressed and an alternate justification that justifies changing course. MN 58 brings the evaluation of the communication, and MN 61 guides future revision (Ṭhānissaro, 1997a, 2006). An interlude becomes ethically effective if it contributes to making this determination rather than eternally delaying responsibility.

The pieces are recursive rather than a fixed pattern of psychological phases. Additional testimony can produce an unforeseen outcome and change the aim of an intervention. An intervention can be designed, for example, to elicit a response but instead trigger a unanticipated wish to punish. During a crisis, protective behavior may have to occur before careful consideration.

Table: 1 indicates the association of sources and educational extensions. The labels "direct, " "interpretive" and "constructive" refer to the nature of each link, not to the quality of authority of the entire tradition.

Component	Principal textual warrant	Educational extension	Evidence of learning
Recognizing condition	MN 10 and DN 22 distinguish bodily, affective, and mental experience	Separate observation from interpretation	Identifies a condition without asserting another person's motives as fact
Examining purpose	Commentarial purpose and suitability; contextual support from MN 117	Examine declared aims and competing motives	Explains a defensible purpose and a possible distortion
Considering effects	Reciprocal protection in SN 47.19; harm review in MN 61	Include affected persons and unequal vulnerability	Uses testimony and acknowledges uncertainty
Choosing action	Speech judgement in MN 58; temporal reflection in MN 61	Select, explain, review, and repair a response	Gives reasons for a proportionate response and revises it when warranted

Note. The four components and evidence indicators are suggested here. The table makes no claim for a four-step educational model of any individual's discourse.

COMPARISON WITH NORTHERN BUDDHIST RESOURCES

6.1 The Chinese parallel as a comparative witness

Anālayo (2012)'s translation of the Saṃyukta-āgama parallel supplies one similar acrobat story and an account of protection through cultivation and non-harming. This comparison offers the basis for the inquiry to extend beyond one English version of the Pāli discourse. Also, that comparison demonstrates that a textual comparison has already been attempted. The present article uses this already-published study, rather than asserting an original philological work on the Chinese.

This comparison also has its pedagogical benefit: teachers can show the other witness without having to demand that all the words agree. Learners can discover what relation is maintained and, which details differ. Such exercises combine attention to the text with ethical investigation. It also keeps "Northern Buddhism" from becoming a heterogeneous category in which early Āgama texts and later Mahāyāna writings share the same temporal location (Anālayo, 2013).

6.2 Śāntideva on guarding awareness and concern for others

The Bodhicaryāvatāra fifth chapter, which connects mind and mindfulness protection to the protection of the vinaya and the eighth that elaborates the proper mindful examination of oneself and others both offer a Mahāyāna parallel in which mindfulness is grounded in the bodhisattva's task rather than conceived as a transcendental competence (Śāntideva 1995 chs (Śāntideva, 1995, chs. 5, 8). 5, 8). The comparison makes sense but does not prove that the Sanskrit samprajanya has the same role as the Pāli sampajaññan in every respect.

The second pedagogical use is to investigate whether a person's story of benefit alters if it is narrated from a different perspective. A student who is sympathetic to public criticism of a competitor might re-evaluate the situation if it is pictured as applied to a trusted companion. This tool can reveal distinctions of concern. This exercise is limited to the classroom; it does not claim to recreate the entirety of Śāntideva's meditative training or to account for bodhicitta. A wider philosophical account of perceptual ethics brings context for this deployment of the comparison (Garfield, 2022).

6.3 Compassionate responsiveness without doctrinal homogenisation

Chapter 25 of the Lotus Sūtra, Avalokiteśvara's chapter, invokes compassionate responsiveness to suffering in a devotional-salvific register (Kubo & Yuyama, 2007, ch. 25). Its pertinence in this context is comparative: it is another Buddhist resource for raising the question of whether responsiveness meets suffering's needs. Do not simply turn it into an early Buddhist psychological account or treat it as the kind of empirical evidence that a classroom exercise does change behavior.

The concretized, practical discussion of everyday mindfulness offered by Thich Nhat Hanh gives a contemporary Vietnamese Buddhist point of comparison (Nhat Hanh, 1999). A Buddhist institution might use it to link contemplative study with the possible actions of the ordinary person. But, it needs to set apart the voice of the contemporary educator from that of a translation of MN 10. The suggested structure can include these resources because it recognizes the differing functions of each, early- discourse warrant commentary later doctrinal comparison and contemporary pedagogical articulations.

The plural use of sources prevents asserting a division where Theravāda focuses solely on the self and Mahāyāna introduces concern for others. SN 47.19 directly challenges such a division. At the same time, distinctions in vows, goals, and philosophical commitments should not be erased by a general discourse of kindness. Cross-traditional comparison is most valuable when it elucidates relationships while maintaining the differences that justify the comparison (Harvey, 2000).

EDUCATIONAL APPLICATIONS

7.1 Communication in a multilingual seminar

In the first hypothetical scenario, a student laughs when a peer mispronounces an English technical term. The peer then stops speaking. An instructor needs to respond, but an immediate public reprimand might escalate the situation into a struggle over humiliation. The setup initially focuses on the instructor's own feelings of irritation and urgency. It then considers whether the goal is to discipline the laughing student, encourage the peer's continued participation, establish a standard of respect, or address several of these objectives simultaneously.

Effects are to be considered for both the individual affected and the class. The embarrassed speaker need not be "outed" to the class as a distressed person. The snickering student can be led to experience his or her effect of the behaviour without necessarily being labeled as a mean-spirited individual. The teacher might break up the laughter, acknowledge the norm of not ridiculing, and ask the affected individual what they would like to do next. For a teachable moment might follow on what occurred and how it may be mended. This is an application of speech judgement and reflective review, not an incident history from the sources (Ṭhānissaro, 1997a, 2006).

Allow students who are evaluating the case to generate alternative justifiable responses. Students should be required to justify this course of action, predict implications, and specify what extra information could alter their decision. A response that simply advises the shy learner to breathe may prove unsatisfactory as it shifts the whole brunt onto the individual feeling uncomfortable. Berger et al. framing of social orientation and personal awareness is critical to this distinction.

7.2 Disagreement about doctrine and evidence

The second set of students have a disagreement about whether a modern interpretation is an apt representation of a standard passage. One student considers impugning the interpretation to be an insult to a teacher; another considers any expression of tact to constitute censorship. Awareness of your condition might simply show loyalty, anger, or anxiety about making a mistake publicly. Weighing purpose determines whether the conversation aims at illumination conquest institutional safeguarding or some combination thereof.

The refutation may be expressed strongly. Students need to pin down what the passage says, separate translation from interpretation, and provide reasons intelligible to others. The GP facilitator can avoid the risk of discouraging participation by affording evidence of correctness; anger is acknowledged without insisting the speaker reverse an appropriate critique, and confidence in a point is not reason to laugh at the speaker. The difference between free and mutual speech may be understood (Ṭhānissaro 1997a MN 58) (Ṭhānissaro, 1997a, MN 58).

It can contrast two narratives: "I was calm" and "I pinpointed the contested translation, proposed an alternative, rectified a hyperbole, and clarified why there was still dissension." The second offers tangible evidence of responsibility. It might be uttered by someone who is still uneasy. This difference is a good example of an educational principle where mindfulness is reframed with broader goals; it is not synonymous with a preferred emotional demeanor (McCaw, 2020).

7.3 Responsibility in community service

In the third case, students plan a community meal. A volunteer observes photos of recipients being taken for publicity without an obvious means for refusal. The volunteer suspects its complaining may delay distribution and anger the organizers. Recognition see anxiety and desire to avoid conflict. Examination of purpose differentiate between photographic recording and image-building activities of the organizers. Consideration of effects include recipients' desires and practical disruption of the dinner.

A tit-for-tat counter measure might be requesting that photography halt until a further volunteer can maintain distribution, stating the concern and finding an alternative to having a photograph taken. If photographs have been uploaded, then organizers should seek redress. These conciliatory suggestions are modern pedagogic applications of non-harming and consideration; they are not an assertion that SN 47.19 gives a modern privacy policy (Bodhi 2000 SN 47.19) (Bodhi, 2000, SN 47.19).

The case further demonstrates why institutional arrangements are a topic for reflection. The contributing practice may not be rectified through an individual volunteer's modesty. It may require changes of position, acceptance of confidants, or administration of change in a standard method. The exercise would because of this inquire what circumstances contributed to the issue's vehicle and that has the power to change those circumstances.

7.4 A feasible instructional sequence

A pilot module might be four seminars of about ninety minutes each with brief self-selected, optional reflective practice. The first would look at the core passages and translation decisions. The second would address the commentarial distinctions and look at the communication case. The third would compare the disagreement and community cases including contrarian views. The fourth would revisit student choices and practice both giving and receiving corrective feedback. This is a suggested design, not a dose to be trialled.

Prep for teachers should teach textual competence, ways of permitting difference, awareness of the boundaries of one's competence, and the demonstration of correction. Reflection on practice and teaching competence has these same issues as Kabat-Zinn (2003) raises about clinical work, but it has a different function here than in a clinical intervention. Students need to be able to investigate and critique the domain without having to report their innermost experiences, let alone endorse some spiritual attainment.

ASSESSMENT AND AN EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AGENDA

8.1 Assessing practical reasoning without grading inner life

The assessment is not summative. It is focussed on the reasons for your answers and explanations in response to the example cases, not the virtue of a learner. An educator can determine whether a learner separates observation from inference, names relevant people, offers a defensible purpose and alters an action when information changes. This focus on observable reasoning follows from the requirement to keep building blocks and results explicit in mindfulness studies (Van Dam et al., 2018).

Table: 2 Offers an outline of an initial rubric. It is not a validated rating scale. The use of descriptors is intended to guide discussion and revisions and a total score for the rating scale should not be used to compare virtue and identify spiritual growth.

Criterion	Emerging account	Developing account	Well-supported account
Recognition	Treats an inference as an observed fact	Identifies a state and some assumptions	Separates experience, evidence, and uncertainty
Purpose	Gives only a desired result	Explains an aim and notices a competing motive	Justifies the aim and identifies a relevant constraint
Effects	Considers only the agent or preferred group	Includes another affected person	Considers different positions and seeks relevant testimony

Criterion	Emerging account	Developing account	Well-supported account
Action and revision	Offers a slogan or an unexplained response	Proposes a plausible response with reasons	Explains means, review conditions, and a possible repair

A student's decision not to reveal an intimate experience need not diminish the evaluation. In fictional cases, the logic can be tested without the need to confess. And differences in our cultures in how direct we are, how we handle silence and whether we show emotions must not be taken as if immutable distinctions in our ethical aptitude. Berger et al. (2024) see cultural sensitivity as a critical matter of implementing the rubric; because of this it must be open to challenge elsewhere.

8.2 Testing the proposed mechanisms

Your first study needs to establish whether teachers and learners interpret the components in the way intended. Cognitive interviews could be used to look at whether they are able to differentiate recognition from justification, or whether the translations of prompts change their meaning. Text experts from traditions can judge the warrants, with teachers and students judging usability. Agreement between text experts would indicate clarity and content validity, not behavioral effectiveness.

A future feasibility study could then address participation acceptability teacher workload and unanticipated pressures to display approved emotions. Case responses could be scored by blinded raters who are unaware of the participant's instructional condition. Ratings should address inter-rater agreement, systematic disagreement. And results should include real opportunities to respond, as eloquent case analysis may not translate to behavior (Donald et al (Donald et al., 2019; Kreplin et al., 2018). 2019; Kreplin et al. 2018).

A later comparative study could test whether adding purpose, impact, and response reflection improves outcomes beyond an attention-focused programme matched for time and teacher contact. A reflective ethics module without formal contemplative practice would be another informative comparator. Such a design could ask whether the combined approach contributes anything beyond either element alone. It should not assume that all participants need or benefit from the same intervention, a caution reinforced by the context-specific findings in school research (Dunning et al (Dunning et al., 2019; Kuyken et al., 2022). 2019; Kuyken et al. 2022).

Testable hypotheses might propose that explicitly questioning purpose allows for distinguishing between aims and motives, that investigating impact fosters greater concern for less visible victims, and that reviewing structures encourages a higher readiness to modify problematic responses. These remain hypotheses and could still be disproven, potentially revealing null or negative results like excessive use of euphemisms, heightened self-monitoring, or failure to take action when confronted with a risk tied to acting.

OBJECTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

9.1 Does reflection undermine non-judgemental awareness

A second criticism is that examining motives and consequences inherently brings back the judgement that mindfulness of the practice seeks to escape. This criticism will ring true if the contemplation turns into a spontaneous condemnation of the practitioner. Yet, refraining from a reflexive aversion to an experience is quite different from assessing the merits of a potential course of action, the latter is not a temporal obligation but a choice. Dreyfus (2011) demonstrates why one cannot take for granted that evaluative cognition is the characteristic feature of Buddhist mindfulness.

The difference also safeguards students from moral perfectionism. If students become aware of resentment this need not necessarily be a failed exercise. It can work as a resource for insight and self-restraint. The important question with education is whether such self-awareness helps bring about a more adequate kind of judgment. The end is neither compulsory equanimity nor an eternal internal jury trial of every feeling.

9.2 Does the framework impose a religious ethic

The model is openly Buddhist as a matter of source and open for critique within a Buddhist context. Its use outside such a context needs to be transparently communicated and open to different interpretations. The common respect for harmful consequences or for honesty would not remove the differences in final commitments. In a plural setting, students could compare this model instead of being asked to suspend their final commitments for it. Such a distinction seems compatible with debates about education and covert religious instruction in mindfulness today (Monteiro et al., 2015).

Note that agreement need not be presumed even within a Buddhist facility. Vocations of lay and monastic practitioners diverge, as do the traditions' readings of certain notions. Teachers ought to reveal the source of an instruction and allow for dissent for the instruction's use. The references to Mahāyāna broaden, but not replace, the institution's obligations.

9.3 Does reciprocal protection silence justified conflict

The other objection is that reciprocal care language may cause coercive silencing of dissent or equality of obligation of unequally privileged participants. This interpretation rejects that consequence. An institution must presume a leader has duties that a dependent student may not be sufficiently equipped to discharged. A learner's composure does not mean an institution cannot be negligent in unfair treatment. Reciprocity pertains to social ethical orientation, not duties or risks.

And responsible conduct need not be comfortable. Of course honest assessment may be justified and withdrawal from a harmful situation may be desirable. This section of MN 58 is a reminder that the concept of ethical speech should not be equated with broad terms like always likeable (Ṭhānissaro, 1997a). The scheme is testable to see if it allows for a legitimate challenge of authority, even authority of the teacher.

9.4 Limits of textual reconstruction and application

The study is based largely on English translation and selected secondary source. It is not asserting the primacy in the historical chronology of the all passages under scrutiny, neither presents an exhaustive analysis of the Pāli, Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan traditions. The commentaries are later in history than the discourses, and the Mahāyāna comparisons have different contexts and purpose. These aspects constrain what can be argued for a coherent Buddhist educational doctrine (Kuan, 2008; Anālayo, 2013).

Another shortcoming is choice. Because that is the research problem, we highlight interpersonal judgement in the system. It does not imitate the full contemplative communal, ritual, or liberationist life of a Buddhist tradition. Shulman's (2024) text on the overall context for ethical development – which elevates mindfulness out of a sequence of instruction and toward a greater engagement – is a reminder of this.

Lastly, at present there is no evidence offered to support the rubric or the module it presents. These items are useful at this stage in that they allow assumptions, warrants, and assessment questions to be scrutinized. What is argued here is that empirical research might even have to alter the four-component structure itself, as part of the system's account of responsibility: a programmer that teaches revision should be willing to revise itself.

CONCLUSION

Beyond precision of understanding lies a need to take and retain responsibility, and because of this necessity to account for purpose, for relationships and for appropriateness of action. MN 10 and DN 22 are a reflective space, where experience is revealed through

differentiation, and practice grounded in moral and liberating purposes. Theravāja explanations of sampajañña make the distinctions that support analysis of activity. SN 47.19 centres on safeguarding oneself and others in the reconstruction, with additional logia to support judgements on having done, and viewed the outcome.

The four resulting components are recognizing one's condition, examining purpose, considering effects, and choosing responsible action. Their role is to establish an explicit connection between textual warrants and educational decisions. They are not presented as a recovered accepted classification, and their fourfold structure does not grant scriptural authority. Comparisons with Northern Buddhist sources support a broader discussion while maintaining historical and doctrinal distinctions.

For Buddhist learning, the lesson here is that mindfulness practices need to be combined with opportunities to justify responses, listen to those impacted, and make reparations. Calmness might support that learning but would not provide its standard of achievement. The suggested cases and set of questions provide a provisional model for evaluating reasoning and responsiveness without making a claim to spiritual enlightenment. Whether the approach improves conduct is a question for cooperative, localized empirical research.

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